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  • 13 ore di lettura

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The debate over corporate governance, or how companies are controlled, has flourished vigorously for several years in the U.S. and has now spread to the U.K. This book collects papers by leading academics, bankers, and consultants which discuss major issues in corporate governance in the U.K., Germany, and Japan. It examines the role of shareholders, company boards, and managers under a market-based system as exists in the U.K. and the U.S. in comparison with the insider system found in Japan and, to a lesser extent, Germany. The issue of the effectiveness of the British system and how it might be made more efficient through increasing the accountability of company boards to shareholders, both directly and via the capital market, is extensively discussed.

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Capital Markets and Corporate Governance, John Kay, Douglas McWilliams, Jonathan P. Charkham, Jeremy S. S. Edwards, David Lomax, Alan Hughes, Klaus Fischer, Colin Mayer, Paul Marsh, Jenny Corbett, Nicholas Dimsdale, Martha Prevezer, Ellen Schneider-Lenné, Allen Sykes, National Economic Development Office, Adrian Beecroft, Miles Middleton, Seiichi Masuyama, Martin Ricketts, Andrew Sentance

Lingua
Pubblicato
1994
Rilegatura
(Copertina rigida)
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Titolo
Capital Markets and Corporate Governance
Lingua
Inglese
Pubblicato
1994
Formato
Copertina rigida
Pagine
349
ISBN10
0198287887
ISBN13
9780198287889
Serie
Descrizione
The debate over corporate governance, or how companies are controlled, has flourished vigorously for several years in the U.S. and has now spread to the U.K. This book collects papers by leading academics, bankers, and consultants which discuss major issues in corporate governance in the U.K., Germany, and Japan. It examines the role of shareholders, company boards, and managers under a market-based system as exists in the U.K. and the U.S. in comparison with the insider system found in Japan and, to a lesser extent, Germany. The issue of the effectiveness of the British system and how it might be made more efficient through increasing the accountability of company boards to shareholders, both directly and via the capital market, is extensively discussed.