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EU law is seen as essential for European integration, with the European Commission acting as 'the Guardian of the Treaties' to enforce it. However, the Commission's enforcement is often selective and strategic, as it does not always prosecute noncompliance by Member States. Yaning Zhang argues that this forbearance stems from differing enforcement rationales. He posits that the Commission functions as both a political agent and a judicial trustee, balancing its legislative and political goals with the need to maintain the stability of the EU legal order. This interaction results in four ideal types of toleration for noncompliance. The book examines four specific cases of leniency: pharmaceutical parallel trade, opaque defense procurement, treatment of irregular migrants, and discriminatory car toll regulations. These examples illustrate that the Commission's strategic enforcement is influenced by various enforcement incentives rather than a single egocentric motive. The normative implications of each type of forbearance vary significantly. Through its innovative typology and comprehensive empirical analysis, the work provides fresh insights into the intricate relationship between law and politics within the EU.
Acquisto del libro
The European Commission's Toleration of Noncompliance with EU Law, Yaning Zhang
- Lingua
- Pubblicato
- 2025
- Rilegatura
- (Copertina rigida)
Metodi di pagamento
Ancora nessuna valutazione.
- Titolo
- The European Commission's Toleration of Noncompliance with EU Law
- Sottotitolo
- A Guardian with Two Faces
- Lingua
- Inglese
- Autori
- Yaning Zhang
- Editore
- Oxford University Press
- Pubblicato
- 2025
- Formato
- Copertina rigida
- Pagine
- 272
- ISBN10
- 019892108X
- ISBN13
- 9780198921080
- Serie
- Tag
- Saggistica, Scienze sociali, Scienze politiche & Politica, Tematica giuridica, Politica, Teorie Politiche, Relazioni internazionali
- Descrizione
- EU law is seen as essential for European integration, with the European Commission acting as 'the Guardian of the Treaties' to enforce it. However, the Commission's enforcement is often selective and strategic, as it does not always prosecute noncompliance by Member States. Yaning Zhang argues that this forbearance stems from differing enforcement rationales. He posits that the Commission functions as both a political agent and a judicial trustee, balancing its legislative and political goals with the need to maintain the stability of the EU legal order. This interaction results in four ideal types of toleration for noncompliance. The book examines four specific cases of leniency: pharmaceutical parallel trade, opaque defense procurement, treatment of irregular migrants, and discriminatory car toll regulations. These examples illustrate that the Commission's strategic enforcement is influenced by various enforcement incentives rather than a single egocentric motive. The normative implications of each type of forbearance vary significantly. Through its innovative typology and comprehensive empirical analysis, the work provides fresh insights into the intricate relationship between law and politics within the EU.