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Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War

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  • 304pagine
  • 11 ore di lettura

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On August 4, 1964, U.S. Navy destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy reported an attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin. President Lyndon Johnson quickly ordered airstrikes against North Vietnam, leading to Congress passing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on August 7, granting him authority to take "all necessary measures" to prevent further aggression. Initially, crew members believed they were under attack, but subsequent analysis suggests that radar images of torpedo boats may have been false, caused by weather, birds, or American planes. Edwin Moise's thorough reconstruction reveals that no North Vietnamese attack occurred, attributing the report to a genuine mistake rather than a deliberate deception. He contextualizes this error by recounting an actual battle involving the Maddox just two days earlier and highlights the contradictory U.S. policy of the time. While Johnson's advisors were planning to escalate the conflict, he simultaneously cut the military budget, reflecting the complexities of American involvement in Vietnam during 1964.

Acquisto del libro

Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, Edwin E. Moïse

Lingua
Pubblicato
1996
Rilegatura
(Copertina rigida)
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Metodi di pagamento

Titolo
Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War
Lingua
Inglese
Formato
Copertina rigida
Pagine
304
ISBN10
0807823007
ISBN13
9780807823002
Serie
Descrizione
On August 4, 1964, U.S. Navy destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy reported an attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin. President Lyndon Johnson quickly ordered airstrikes against North Vietnam, leading to Congress passing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on August 7, granting him authority to take "all necessary measures" to prevent further aggression. Initially, crew members believed they were under attack, but subsequent analysis suggests that radar images of torpedo boats may have been false, caused by weather, birds, or American planes. Edwin Moise's thorough reconstruction reveals that no North Vietnamese attack occurred, attributing the report to a genuine mistake rather than a deliberate deception. He contextualizes this error by recounting an actual battle involving the Maddox just two days earlier and highlights the contradictory U.S. policy of the time. While Johnson's advisors were planning to escalate the conflict, he simultaneously cut the military budget, reflecting the complexities of American involvement in Vietnam during 1964.