Jörg Rothe Libri

This textbook connects three vibrant areas at the interface between economics and computer science: algorithmic game theory, computational social choice, and fair division. It thus offers an interdisciplinary treatment of collective decision making from an economic and computational perspective. Part I introduces to algorithmic game theory, focusing on both noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Part II introduces to computational social choice, focusing on both preference aggregation (voting) and judgment aggregation. Part III introduces to fair division, focusing on the division of both a single divisible resource ("cake-cutting") and multiple indivisible and unshareable resources ("multiagent resource allocation"). In all these parts, much weight is given to the algorithmic and complexity-theoretic aspects of problems arising in these areas, and the interconnections between the three parts are of central interest.

Modern cryptology increasingly employs mathematically rigorous concepts and methods from complexity theory. Conversely, current research topics in complexity theory are often motivated by questions and problems from cryptology. This book takes account of this situation, and therefore its subject is what may be dubbed "cryptocomplexity'', a kind of symbiosis of these two areas. This book is written for undergraduate and graduate students of computer science, mathematics, and engineering, and can be used for courses on complexity theory and cryptology, preferably by stressing their interrelation. Moreover, it may serve as a valuable source for researchers, teachers, and practitioners working in these fields. Starting from scratch, it works its way to the frontiers of current research in these fields and provides a detailed overview of their history and their current research topics and challenges.

Dieses Buch führt in das junge, interdisziplinäre Gebiet Computational Social Choice ein, das an der Schnittstelle zwischen der Informatik und den Politik- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften liegt. Ausgehend von der klassischen Spiel- und Social-Choice-Theorie werden die algorithmischen Eigenschaften von Spielen, Wahlen und Aufteilungsverfahren in leicht verständlicher und dennoch exakter Form präsentiert.