Terence Zuber Libri

"The Real German War Plan, 1904-14 fundamentally changes our understanding of German military planning before the First World War. On the basis of newly discovered or long-neglected documents in German military archives, this book gives the first description of Schlieffen's war plans in 1904, 1905 and 1906 and Moltke's plans from 1907 to 1914. It explodes unfounded myths concerning German war planning, gives the first appraisal of the actual military and political factors that influenced it, proves conclusively that there never was a 'Schlieffen Plan' and reveals Moltke's stragegy for a war against Russia from 1909 to 1912. Tracing the decline in the German military position and the recognition by 1913 that Germany would be forced to fight outnumbered on both the eastern and western fronts, it is an essential read for anyone with an interest in the First World War."--Back cover

"This book makes available in English translation many of the documents concerning German war planning before 1914 that survived the Second World War. They had been closely guarded by the East German army archives, and only became available with the fall of the Berlin wall." "Included are: Wilhelm Dieckmann's 'Der Schlieffenplan', assembled from archive sources; Hellmuth Greiner's account of the German west front intelligence estimate from 1885 to 1914; and two of the younger Moltke's General Staff exercises. The book also presents other little-known documents found in German archives as well as the most important 1920s literature concerning the debate on the German war plan."--Jacket

The existence of the Schlieffen plan has been one of the basic assumptions of twentieth-century military history. It was the perfect example of the evils of German aggressive, mechanical, disdainful of politics and of public morality. The Great War began in August 1914 allegedly because the Schlieffen plan forced the German government to transform a Balkan quarrel into a World War by attacking France. And, in the end, the Schlieffen plan failed at the battle of the Marne.Yet it has always been recognized that the Schlieffen plan included inconsistencies which have never been satisfactorily explained. On the basis of newly discovered documents from German archives, Terence Zuber presents a radically different picture of German war planning between 1871 and 1914, and concludes that, in fact, there never really was a `Schlieffen plan'.

Focusing on the overlooked German perspective, this book reevaluates the battles of Mons and Le Cateau, traditionally seen as British victories due to their effective rifle fire. It utilizes German tactics manuals and regimental histories to reveal a more nuanced view, highlighting the tactical sophistication of German forces and suggesting that the odds were more even than previously thought. By challenging standard narratives and casualty figures, it offers fresh insights into these pivotal battles, marking a significant shift in historical interpretation after ninety years.

Focusing on Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke, this groundbreaking work by Terence Zuber challenges conventional narratives surrounding the Prussian Army's chief of staff. Zuber delves into Moltke's strategies and decisions, revealing how his legacy has been mythologized over time. The book offers a critical analysis of military history and leadership, providing fresh insights into Moltke's role and influence within the Prussian military establishment.

In August 1914 the German main attack was conducted by the 2nd Army.Making use of both German and Belgian sources, and supported by tactical maps, this book for the first time describes and evaluates the construction of the fortress, its military purpose, the German plan and the conduct of the attack.