James R. Mensch Libri

This study proposes a double thesis. The first concerns the Logische Untersuchungen itself. We will attempt to show that its statements about the nature of being are inconsistent and that this inconsis­ tency is responsible for the failure of this work. The second con­ cerns the Logische Untersuchungen's relation to the Ideen. The latter, we propose, is a response to the failure of the Logische Untersuchungen's ontology. It can thus be understood in terms of a shift in the ontology of the Logische Untersuchungen, a shift motivated by the attempt to overcome the contradictory assertions of the Logische Untersuchungen. In this sense our thesis is that, in the technical meaning that Husserl gives the term, the Logische Untersuchungen and the Ideen can be linked via a "motivated path. " We can, by way of an introduction, clarify our theses by regard­ ing three elements. The first is the relation of epistemology to ontology. The second is the notion of motivation as Husserl conceives the term. The third is the fundamental distinctions that are to be explained via the notion of motivation. 1. We should begin by remarking that the goal of the Logische Untersuchungen is explicitly epistemological; it is that of answer­ ing "the cardinal question of epistemology, the question concerning the objectivity of knowledge" (LU, Tub. ed. , I, 8; F. , p. 56V For Husserl, his other questions - i. e.

Exploring the relationship between human embodiment and political life, this book employs Merleau-Ponty's notion of 'intertwining' to analyze how individual existence influences and is influenced by societal structures. It delves into the intricate connections between self and world, offering a philosophical perspective on the nature of the body politic and its reflection of human experience.

This book offers a fresh look at Edmund Husserl’s philosophy as a nonfoundational approach to understanding the self as an embodied presence. Contrary to the conventional view of Husserl as carrying on the Cartesian tradition of seeking a trustworthy foundation for knowledge in the "pure" observations of a disembodied ego, James Mensch introduces us to the Husserl who, anticipating the later investigations of Merleau-Ponty, explored how the body functions to determine our self-presence, our freedom, and our sense of time. The result is a concept of selfhood that allows us to see how consciousness’s arising from sensuous experiences follows from the temporal features of embodiment. From this understanding of what is crucial to Husserl’s phenomenology, the book draws the implications for language and ethics, comparing Husserl’s ideas with those of Derrida on language and with those of Heidegger and Levinas on responsibility. Paradoxically, it is these postmodernists who are shown to be extending the logic of foundationalism to its ultimate extreme, whereas Husserl can be seen as leading the way beyond modernity to a nonfoundational account of the self and its world.

A coherent theory of ethics, as argued by James R. Mensch, necessitates an understanding of selfhood, particularly in the context of preventing genocide. He emphasizes the importance of achieving critical distance for ethical judgment without adopting a superhuman perspective. Mensch explores selfhood through embodiment and the empathy that arises in interactions with others, using Holocaust accounts to illustrate how empathy facilitates moral obligation. His analysis includes insights from major moral philosophers and advocates for literature as essential for grasping ethical responsibility, presenting a fresh perspective on ethics.

Emmanuel Levinas's work delves into the philosophical concept of "the Other," exploring themes of ethics and existence. Renowned for its originality and profound insights, the text challenges readers with its complexity, making it a significant yet demanding contribution to philosophical discourse. Its enduring relevance solidifies its status as a cornerstone for those seeking a deeper understanding of Levinas's thought.

The question of how to read the Bible is a perennial one. How do we interpret the God who claims to transcend our human categories? The difficulty is particularly acute in John's Gospel with its account of a man, Jesus, who claims to be God. Based on the principle that a text can present the radically transcendent only by disrupting itself, this book considers not just the sense of the Gospel, but also the breakdown of this sense. Focusing on its failure to humanly locate its central character and on the many misunderstandings which surround him, it presents a new approach to the Gospel's paradoxes. The result is a new definition of this sacred text based on a new hermeneutics.

For a reader versed in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of political philosophy, the Czech philosopher, Jan Pato? cka, appears as a paradoxical figure. A champion of human rights, he seems to present himself and his philosophy in quite traditional terms. He speaks of the “soul,” its “care,” and of “living in truth.” Such concepts are combined with his insistence on the unconditional character of morality. Yet, in his proposal for an “asubjective” phenomenology, he undermines the traditional conceptions of the subject of such rights. In fact, what Pato? cka forged in the last years of his life was a new conception of human being, one that finds its origins as much in Aristotle as in the phenomenological tradition. This book traces the influence of Husserl, Heidegger, and Aristotle, among others, on the development of Pato? cka’s thought. It shows how the confluence of these influences led Pato? cka to redefine, not just phenomenology, but also the basic terms in which the debates on human rights have traditionally been cast.