Stephan Jank Ordine dei libri

This paper analyzes how newly introduced transparency requirements for short positions affect investors' behavior and security prices. Employing a unique data set, which contains both public positions above and confidential positions below the regulatory disclosure threshold, we offer several novel insights. Positions accumulate just below the threshold, indicating that a sizable fraction of short sellers are reluctant to disclose their positions publicly. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the transparency measures effectively represent a short-sale constraint for secretive investors, which results in stocks to be overpriced. Specifically, when this constraint is potentially binding, stocks subsequently exhibit a negative abnormal return of 1.0-1.4% on a monthly basis. Different placebo tests verify that the short-sale constraint originates from the disclosure threshold. Overall, these findings suggest that short sellers' evasive behavior in response to the transparency regulation imposes a negative externality on stock market efficiency.

Dieses Büchlein ist eine Einladung zur Debatte einer anderen Betrachtung des kapitalistischen Prozesses. Es präsentiert zunächst eine mathematische Beschreibung jener historisch spezifischen Form des kapitalistischen Tausches, die nach unserer Überzeugung allein jene verheerende Wirkkraft entwickelt, die uns mittlerweile global als Autoren unserer gesellschaftlichen Biographie liquidiert hat. Erst die, aus der Untersuchung dieser spezifischen Tauschform resultierende Frage nach Bestimmungsmerkmalen des aktuellen Geldes führt in der Folge zur Entwicklung eines belastbaren Wertbegriffs, den wir abschließend jener mathematischen Gesetzmäßigkeit zugrunde legen, der wir die kapitalistische Veranstaltung in ihrer Gesamtheit unterworfen behaupten.

This paper studies the flow-performance relationship of three different investor groups in mutual funds: Households, financial corporations, and insurance companies and pension funds, establishing the following findings: Financial corporations have a strong tendency to chase past performance and also hold an increased share in the top performing funds. Insurance companies and pension funds show some evidence of performance chasing, but are underrepresented in the best performing funds. Households chase performance, but they are also subject to status quo bias in their flows. Regarding investor composition the worst performing funds show no significant difference in their investor structure when compared to funds with average performance. -- Mutual Funds ; Flow-Performance Relationship ; Clientele

This paper investigates the purchases and redemptions of a large cross-sectional sample of German equity funds. We find that investors punish bad performance by selling their shares, but also have a tendency to sell winners. Investors in large fund families show higher sales and redemption rates. Furthermore, family size also affects the flow-performance relationship. On the one hand, investors in large families punish bad performance more, on the other, they also tend to sell winners more. Finally, we find that inner-family rankings play an important role for redemptions, with investors strongly redeeming their shares from intra-family losers