Hovenkamp confronts not only the problems of poorly designed, overly complex, and inconsistent antitrust rules but also the current disarray of antitrust's rule of reason, offering an antitrust policy faithful to the consumer welfare principle and more readily manageable by the federal courts and other antitrust tribunals.
The book explores the interplay between legal and economic theories in shaping American business regulations from Andrew Jackson's era through the first New Deal. It highlights how classical economic ideas about free markets influenced the development of private and public law, ultimately impacting the structure of modern business corporations and the concept of substantive due process. Hovenkamp provides a detailed analysis of this dynamic relationship during a period of significant growth in the U.S. economy.
In recent years, the astronomical rise of tech giants like Amazon, Apple, Meta, and Microsoft has been criticized as anticompetitive, and many have wondered if antitrust law can help protect workers and consumers. In Tech Monopoly, Herbert Hovenkamp explores competition problems in a wide range of high-tech firms—from those that sell purely digital products, such as video streaming, search, software, or email services, to others that sell more traditional "tactile" products, such as hardware, clothing, groceries, or rides. He offers a realistic look at the powers and limitations of antitrust law in tech markets with an assessment that is as comprehensive as it is accessible.After a general introduction to antitrust law, Tech Monopoly considers how competitive harm should be assessed in these markets. Then Hovenkamp looks at the role of large digital platforms, including Amazon, Alphabet, Apple, Meta, and Microsoft, and considers whether their size alone is an antitrust problem or if the concern should be limited to market power. Finally, the author addresses the very difficult problem of remedies. Should we "break up" big tech, and if so, how? What kind of breakup of these firms would make users or others better off? And if breakups are not the only possible antitrust fix, are there more effective and less disruptive alternatives?