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The book explores recent advancements in learning and competition through finite automata and dynamic mechanism design, addressing various auction mechanisms under different constraints. It delves into truthful auctions aiming for optimal profit and mechanisms with verification across finite domains. The complexities of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in congestion and local-effect games are examined, alongside strong and correlated equilibria in monotone congestion games. The existence of equilibria in finite network congestion games is analyzed, as well as optimal cost-sharing mechanisms for Steiner forest problems. The work also investigates mechanisms to induce random choices and Bayesian optimal no-deficit designs. It discusses game-theoretic aspects of hyperlink structures and customer competition in social networks, along with the challenges of selfish service installation in networks and connectivity games. Additionally, it covers assignment problems in rental markets and portfolio risk-adjusted duration models. The text presents new algorithms for market equilibrium computations, rationality in Eisenberg-Gale markets, and the operationalization of economic theory. Sparse games are identified as complex, while polynomial algorithms for approximating Nash equilibria in bimatrix games are proposed. The book also touches on ranking sports teams, the price of anarchy in polynomial Wardrop games, and worm propagation models b
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Internet and network economics, Paul G. Spirakis
- Lingua
- Pubblicato
- 2006
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- (In brossura)
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