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Strategic Social Choice

Stable Representations of Constitutions

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Pagine
154pagine
Tempo di lettura
6ore

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Focusing on the theoretical frameworks of constitutions and decision-making, this work explores various models, including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and Nash equilibrium representations. It delves into the relationship between constitutions and effectivity functions, offering insights on game forms and their implications in political theory. The text presents a detailed analysis of Nash consistent representations and their relevance to liberalism and Pareto optimality. With contributions from notable scholars, it serves as a comprehensive resource for understanding these complex concepts.

Pubblicazione

Acquisto del libro

Strategic Social Choice, Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters

Lingua
Pubblicato
2010
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