The aim of Twentieth-century phenomenology is to provide a non-psychologistic interpretation of subjectivity. Husserl aligns with Frege in rejecting psychologism, asserting that it undermines truth. However, this rejection should not deter the exploration of the subjective perspective. Instead, Husserl believes it is essential to demonstrate how propositions relate to and are grounded in subjective intuitions without reducing them to mere psychological phenomena. This necessitates a clear distinction between the subjective perspective and the psychological realm. Phenomenology seeks to develop a notion of subjectivity that aligns with our lived experience of the world. A core principle is that philosophy should not challenge this experience but rather explain it. Thus, phenomenology must avoid a conception of subjectivity that complicates how a subject connects with the world. In essence, a phenomenological interpretation must distance itself from the notion of a worldless, Cartesian subject, or res cogitans. At the same time, it cannot solely describe the human order using categories suited to the physical realm, as this would contradict the very experiential foundation that underpins such interpretations.
