Offensives and Counteroffensives in the South-West
88pagine
4 ore di lettura
The book delves into the critical events of the Indo-Pakistani War, focusing on the southwestern border region between India and Pakistan. It provides an in-depth analysis of the military strategies, political dynamics, and the impact of the conflict on the local populations. Through detailed accounts and historical context, it sheds light on the complexities of the war and its lasting implications for both nations.
The book explores the tumultuous events surrounding the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan, highlighting the hasty decisions made by Great Britain, which rushed a complex process that should have taken years. It delves into the historical context of Britain's weakened state post-World Wars and the resulting chaos that ensued from a lack of guidance and consensus, ultimately shaping the destinies of millions in the subcontinent.
Through extensive use of official records and participant recollections, rare
photography and authentic colour profiles, Ravi Rikhye tells the captivating
story of the 1971 Indo-Pak War, the biggest military conflict fought between
India and Pakistan to date, and the war that resulted in emergence of
Bangladesh as an independent nation.
The analysis asks one question and has one answer: Can India fight a two-front war against China and Pakistan? The answer is it cannot. Because of the China-Pakistan alliance, we cannot fight even a one-front war: engaging in a war with either adversary runs the risk of weakening the other front, leaving it open to exploitation. The solution, fortunately, is straightforward: build a 2-front war capability. The next problem is equally straightforward: The Government of India is determined not to spend money on defense. Today spending is down to 1.56% of GDP, lower even than in 1962. And we know how that ended. It takes little imagination to foresee what would have happened if 1962 had become 2-front: Pakistan would have walked over Punjab, perhaps all the way to Delhi, and we would have lost Kashmir too. If we chose to defend Punjab, we would have lost the North East Frontier Agency, now called Arunachal. If we tried to defend both fronts, we would have lost both. For a strong defensive posture, we need to spend the 3
The book presents an extensive compilation of ground orders of battle, detailing the organizational structures and deployment strategies of various armies worldwide. It serves as a valuable resource for military enthusiasts, historians, and researchers, offering insights into the tactical frameworks employed by different nations.