Examines the social and economic role of the German army in the nation's internal affairs during World War I.
L'eredità della Grande Guerra Serie
Questa serie offre un'esplorazione completa della Grande Guerra, presentando studi originali accanto a memorie essenziali e resoconti di prima mano. Mira a fornire ai lettori una vasta gamma di prospettive su questo periodo storico cruciale. Molte di queste opere europee vitali vengono rese disponibili in inglese per la prima volta, arricchendo la comprensione globale del conflitto.



This study examines fictional recreations of the First World War in the interwar years and the phenomenal success of one play, Sheriff's Journey's End. The author challenges the notion of a 'modern' memory generated by the First World War by arguing that middlebrow texts formulated a set of images and ideas that eclipsed the wartime upheaval and imputed conservative 'meanings' to the collective memory.
Legacy of the Great War: Germany and the Causes of the First World War
- 280pagine
- 10 ore di lettura
How can we understand the causes of World War I and Germany's role in it? This book prompts a re-evaluation of the events leading to the global conflict in 1914. Recent historical interpretations suggest that German leaders acted defensively in response to a deteriorating military and diplomatic situation. However, this work challenges that view, emphasizing that the German Chancellor, Foreign Office, and Great General Staff believed in their ability to win a continental war. This confidence stemmed from an assumption of French decline and Russian weakness prior to the war. Consequently, German policymakers pursued aggressive strategies, risking conflict during critical moments in the early 20th century. The author examines how enemy states were stereotyped, the portrayal of war during peacetime, and the evolving perceptions of international relations. He highlights the influence of ruling elites, political parties, big business, and the press, arguing that significant shifts in German foreign policy occurred in the decade leading up to the war. By the July crisis of 1914, perceptions had shifted, with Russia emerging as the primary adversary. Under these new circumstances, German leaders could adopt a strategy of brinkmanship, using war as a policy tool to its fullest extent.